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Leibniz’s Mirrors: Reflecting the Past 
 
 
Pauline Phemister (Edinburgh) 
 
 
 
My aim in this paper is to explore Leibniz’s intriguing description of the monad 
as a living mirror of the universe.1 I begin with a few brief observations on the 
status of mirrors in seventeenth century France, before embarking on a more 
detailed examination of the metaphor itself that focuses in particular on the ways 
in which mirrors represent space and time, the varying degrees of clarity and 
distinctness of their representations, and the ways in which mirrors reflect 
themselves. After arguing that all reflections are reflections upon the past and 
that self-reflection rests in part on the ability to perceive others different from 
the self, I turn finally to the question of how self-reflecting moral beings might 
best reflect the lives of others, and conclude by suggesting that self-reflecting 
beings have a moral imperative to love other self-reflecting beings, be they in the 
past, the present or the future, and to mirror the beauty of the world and its 
creator God as best they can.2 
 
 
1. Seventeenth century mirrors 
 
Michel Foucault’s critique of signs in the French classical period may have given 
rise to the modern characterization of the period as the ‘age of representation’,3 
                                                        
1 In references, I employ the standard abbreviations: AG = G. W. Leibniz: Philosophical 
Essays, ed. and transl. by R. Ariew and D. Garber, Indianapolis 1989; DSR = Id.: De 
Summa Rerum: Metaphysical Papers, 1675-1676, transl. by G. H. R. Parkinson, New Haven 
and London, 1992; L = Id.: Philosophical Papers and Letters, ed. and transl. by L. E. 
Loemker, Dordrecht 21969; LA = G. W. Leibniz/A. Arnauld: The Leibniz-Arnauld 
Correspondence, ed. and transl. by H. T. Mason, Manchester 1967; LTS = G. W. Leibniz: 
Leibniz and the Two Sophies: The Philosophical Correspondence, ed. and transl. by Lloyd 
Strickland, Toronto 2011; LV = G. W. Leibniz/ B. De Volder: The Leibniz-De Volder 
Correspondence, ed. and transl. by Paul Lodge, New Haven and London 2013; RB = G. W. 
Leibniz: New Essays on Human Understanding, ed. and transl. by Peter Remnant and 
Jonathan Bennett, Cambridge 1981.  
2 On Leibniz’s use of metaphors more generally, the following studies are invaluable: 
Marcelo Dascal: Leibniz. Language, Signs and Thought: a collection of essays, Amsterdam 
& Philadelphia 1987; Cristina Marras: “On the Metaphorical Network of Leibniz’s 
Philosophy”, PhD Dissertation, Tel Aviv University 2003; Id.: “Leibniz and his 
metaphorical labyrinths: the manneristic and the unicursale”, in: Domenic Berlioz and 
Frédéric Nef (eds.): Leibniz et les puissances du langage, Paris 2005, pp. 285-300; Id.: 
“The role of metaphor in Leibniz’s epistemology”, in: Marcelo Dascal (ed.): Leibniz: What 
Kind of Rationalist?, Dordrecht 2008, pp. 199-212; and Don Rutherford: “Metaphor and 
the Language of Philosophy”, in D. Berlioz and F. Nef (eds.): Leibniz et les puissances du 
langage, pp. 271-284. 
3 Michel Foucault: The Order of Things: Archaeology of the Human Sciences, London 1970. 
Originally published as Les Mots et les Choses: une archéologie des sciences humaines, 
Paris 1966.  
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but Molière scholar Larry Norman suggests that the age might equally and 
perhaps more appropriately be labeled, the “age of the mirror”.4 Of course, as 
Sabine Melchior-Bonnet observed in her groundbreaking history of the mirror, 
“Man has been interested in his own image since prehistoric times, using all sorts 
of expedients – from dark and shiny stones to pools of water – in order to catch 
his reflection”.5 But even the standing or handheld, highly polished gold, silver or 
bronze metal mirrors of ancient Egyptian, Greek and Roman civilizations were as 
nothing in comparison to the glass mirrors produced in the early modern age. 
During the Renaissance, Venetian masters had developed techniques that vastly 
improved the production and quality of glass mirrors. They guarded the secrets 
of their success very closely, but in the seventeenth century, France broke into 
this monopolized market, founding the Royal Company of Glass and Mirrors and 
eventually succeeding in producing mirrors of reasonable quality at lower cost 
than their higher quality Venetian counterparts. 6  The net result of this 
industrious activity was that by the middle of the seventeenth century, mirrors 
were no longer luxuries of only the royals and aristocratic nobility. The lower 
prices and increased availability enabled the bourgeoisie and the mercantile 
classes to indulge in the craze for the new glass reflective surfaces. Mirrors by 
this time had become fashionable symbols of success and increasingly common 
in everyday life, no longer relegated to boudoirs and dressing rooms, but found 
above mantle-pieces in drawing rooms, between doorways and windows, as well 
as on jewelry, belts, and buttons. And so it was that when Leibniz visited Paris in 
the 1670s, he entered into a veritable ‘age of the mirror’. Mixing in the circles 
that he did, he would have found mirrors practically everywhere he turned.  
 
 
2. Monads as mirrors 
 
Reflections on the surfaces of the mirror are images or representations of the 
world outside of the mirror. It is this feature of the mirror that is uppermost in 
Leibniz’s mind when he introduces the mirror as a simile for the individual 
substance in the text of section 9 of the 1686 Discourse on Metaphysics. Like 
mirrors, each finite perceiving substance is a representative being, albeit one 
whose reflections mirror not only the whole universe, but also its creator, God: 
“every substance is like a complete world and like a mirror of God or of the 
whole universe”.7 In later texts we find Leibniz abandoning the mirror as a mere 
simile in favour of the mirror as a metaphor. Repeatedly in letters to Remond, to 
Des Billettes, and to the Electress Sophie, he makes the point that “each simple 
substance is a mirror of the same universe”;8 “[e]very soul is a mirror of the 
entire world”;9 “a perpetual mirror” of the universe and as durable as the 
                                                        
4 Larry Norman: The Public Mirror: Molière and the social commerce of depiction, Chicago 
1999, p. 2.  
5 Sabine Melchior-Bonnet: The Mirror: A History, transl. by Katharine H. Jewett, London 
2001, p. 9. First published as Histoire du Miroir, Paris 1994. 
6 Melchior-Bonnet, The Mirror, ch.2. 
7 A VI 4B, 1542/ AG 42. 
8 Leibniz to Remond, July 1714; GP III, 623. 
9 Leibniz to Des Billettes, 4/14 December 1696; GP VII, 452/ L 473.  
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universe itself;10 and each a mirror of the universe “in its way”11 or “according to 
its point of view”.12 The metaphor is retained in writings from Leibniz’s final 
years, making its way into both the Monadology13 and the Principles of Nature 
and Grace. In these texts, Leibniz is keen to emphasize the differences between 
ordinary souls and those capable of rational thought. Accordingly, in contrast to 
the opinion he expressed in the earlier Discourse on Metaphysics that every 
substance is “like a mirror of God”, in later writings, being “an image of the 
divinity” is presented as a feature that distinguishes reasonable souls from those 
that mirror only the works of God.14  
 
With the shift from simile to metaphor in the 1690s, substances are no longer 
merely like mirrors: they have become mirrors. The introduction of the stronger 
mirror metaphor coincides with Leibniz’s increasing use of the term ‘monad’ to 
describe the foundational substances of the Leibnizian universe. As primitive 
forces, monads are inherently active beings and Leibniz modifies his mirror 
metaphor to accommodate this. Souls or monads are living mirrors. Each simple 
substance is “a perpetual, living mirror of the universe”,15 each one “endowed 
with internal action”.16  
 
As living mirrors, monads differ from ordinary mirrors in significant ways. 
Monads are naturally indestructible unities, lacking component parts into which 
they could be broken.17 Self-contained, non-interacting and independent, with 
their own internal life forces, they bring forth the images contained in their own 
essences. Not depending upon any other mirrors, their perceptions arise 
spontaneously and would still occur even if no other mirror existed. “[E]ach 
substance is like a world apart, independent of all other things”.18 Even their 
reflections of themselves are entirely internal affairs, something ordinary 
mirrors can have only with the assistance of other mirrors. However, more 
significant are the respects in which living mirrors agree with their ordinary 
lifeless mirror counterparts. We turn now to consider some of those shared 
features, beginning with the spatio-temporal characters of their representations 
of the world.19  
                                                        
10 Leibniz to Sophie, 4 November 1696; GP VII, 542/ LTS 151-152. 
11 Leibniz to Sophie, 6 February 1706; GP VII, 567/ LTS 347. See also Monadology §63; 
GP VI, 618. 
12 To Des Billettes, 4/14 December 1696; GP VII, 452/ L 473. 
13 For instance, Monadology §63; GP VI, 618. 
14 Principles of Nature and Grace §14; GP VI, 604/ AG 211. See also Monadology §83; GP 
VI, 621.  
15 Monadology §56; GP VI, 616/ AG 220. See also, for instance, Leibniz’s unpublished 
remarks on the extract from the Bayle’s Critical Dictionary, article Rorarius, comment L; 
GP IV, 532 and Leibniz’s Fifth Letter to Clarke; GP VII 411. 
16 Principles of Nature and Grace §3; GP VI, 599/ AG 207.  
17 Monadology §77; GP VI, 620. See also, Leibniz to Sophie, 6 February 1706; GP VII, 567. 
18 Discourse on Metaphysics §14; A VI, 4B 1550/ AG 47. See also New System of the Nature 
of Substances and their Communication; GP IV, 484.  
19 Living mirror monads – and ordinary mirrors too – contain infinity. I do not enter 
here into the complexities of mirrors’ infinite natures, but the infinity of the living 
mirror is addressed in Ohad Nachtomy: Living Mirrors: Infinity, Unity, and Life in 
Leibniz’s Philosophy, forthcoming, ch. 7.  
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3. Space and Time 
 
Italian Renaissance masters, such as Filippo Brunelleschi and Paulo Uccello, 
perfected the art of perspective by making lines in the two-dimensional painting 
draw the viewer’s eye towards one or more infinitesimal vanishing points, 
thereby creating the illusion of a three-dimensional spatial image on a two-
dimensional canvas. Mirrors played no small part in the development of the 
technique. When one looks in a mirror, one sees not a flat two-dimensional 
image, but an image with spatial depth that seems to exist in the space behind 
the mirror. Looking at the mirror, one may feel, like Lewis Carroll’s Alice,20 as 
though if one could only walk into the mirror, one would enter a world whose 
contents and spatial dimensions, although reversed, are the same as those in the 
real world that the mirror reflects. Such imaginary outings must remain, 
however, in the realm of fiction. In the actual world, one cannot walk into the 
mirror: beyond its glass remains a closed space, enclosed within the mirror itself, 
a private image of a public world.  
 
In this regard, Leibniz’s mirror-metaphor is strikingly apt. Monads’ perceptual 
representations of the world – their mirror images – also represent the external 
world as a world of bodies with length, breadth and depth situated in a three-
dimensional space, a world that appears as one into which an external being 
could enter, but from which it is forever barred. The three-dimensional space of 
the mirror monad is private to that monad alone, internal to the monad that has 
no windows through which anything can enter or depart and whose 
representations of the external world cannot be transgressed by anything from 
outside. We can no more walk into the three-dimensional world of another 
monad than we can walk into the three-dimensional world of the glass mirror.  
 
Both the artist’s perspectival paintings and the glass-worker’s mirrors produce 
representations of three-dimensional space. However, there is one crucial 
difference between the artist’s reproduction of a three-dimensional space and 
the image in the mirror. On completion, the scenes represented in the painting 
remain static. Barring any later modifications, portraits, still-life studies, and 
landscape paintings do not change: they simply capture in perpetuity a moment 
in time now past. As a consequence of the passage of time in which the light 
passes from the external object to the mirror itself, the images in the mirror 
similarly capture moments in time now past. However, unlike the unchanging 
images in a finished painting, the images in the mirror are in constant flux, 
keeping pace with the changing nature of the things outside that they reflect.  
 
In this regard too, the appropriateness of Leibniz’s mirror-monad is evident. The 
monad’s images also change as the world it represents changes, never the same 
from one moment to the next. Monads’ perceptions or representations keep 
track with the world outside. Moreover, as in ordinary mirrors and paintings 
alike, there is a lapse of time between the event happening in the world and its 
                                                        
20 Lewis Carroll: Through the Looking-Glass, and What Alice Found There, London 1871. 
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representation in the living monad. Monads represent the world through the 
medium of their own bodies, each one perceiving the changes external bodies 
have made on its organic body.21 Just as it takes time for the light from an object 
to travel to the mirror, so too it takes time, however short, for the light to travel 
to the perceiver’s eye. In his New Essays on Human Understanding, Leibniz makes 
the point that our present perceptions of paintings are always perceptions of the 
painting, not as it exists now, but as it existed a moment before. Although we 
might believe that “we immediately see the thing that causes the image”, in fact: 
 
“we see only the image, and are affected only by rays of light. Since rays of light 
need time – however little – to reach us, it is possible that the object should be 
destroyed during the interval and no longer exist when the light reaches the eye; 
and something which no longer exists cannot be the present object of our 
sight”.22  
 
It is not only in the viewing of paintings that time-lapses intervene. Inanimate 
objects and living bodies alike, perceived through any organ of sense, might no 
longer exist by the time their presence has been registered in a perception in the 
soul. Nor are images in ordinary mirrors or sensory images in living mirrors 
excepted: they too register not the present state of the world, but rather its 
immediately preceding state.  
 
A monad’s present images represent the immediately preceding past, but of 
course, as we know, Leibniz holds that the whole of the past and the whole of the 
future are also represented in each present image, although always less 
distinctly than its present perception of the immediate past. Each passing 
present reflection is an effect of all the prior causes that have led up to the events 
now reflected in the monad-mirror. In this sense, the monad-mirror’s images 
stretch backwards in time, even into deep geological time. As Leibniz tells 
Arnauld, “the indications [les traces] of the past are preserved for ever in each 
thing”.23 So too, pointing forwards, one perception paves the way for the next, 
and for the one after that, and for the one after that, and so forth. Hence, the 
present image not only retains “the indications of the past” but also already 
contains the “lineaments [les traits] of the future”.24  
 
Leibniz’s causal explanation of the monad’s mirroring of the past and the future 
would seem to apply equally to ordinary mirrors. Their present images too 
reflect objects with causal histories and future consequences and these past 
causes and future effects might be regarded as in some way also contained in 
mirrors’ images. All mirrors, living and nonliving, can be said to embrace the 
past, the present and the future in each of their fleeting images or perceptions. 
                                                        
21 As Leibniz explains in a letter to Arnauld, 9 October 1687; A II, 2, 242/LA 145: “since 
we perceive other bodies only through their relationship to ours, I was right to say that 
the soul expresses better what pertains to our body; therefore, the satellites of Saturn or 
Jupiter are known only in consequence of a movement which occurs in our eyes”.  
22 A VI, 6, 135/ RB 135. 
23 Leibniz to Arnauld, 30 April 1687; A II, 2, 188/ LA 123. 
24 Ibid.  
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As the following discussion will highlight, however, they do so with varying 
degrees of clarity or distinctness. 
  
 
4. Degrees of representation 
 
Each monad is a living mirror of the whole universe, reflecting each and every 
one of the infinitely many, mutually reflecting, living monad-mirrors that 
comprise Leibniz’s universe. Insofar as they all represent the same universe, the 
representational content of each of their perceptions is the same. This means 
that it is not possible to differentiate one monad from another by reference only 
to the content of their perceptions. However, they can be differentiated by the 
differing ways in which that content is exhibited. Leibniz addressed the issue in a 
draft letter to Nicolas Remond:  
 
“each simple substance is a mirror of the same universe, as lasting and as ample 
as it, although these perceptions of created beings can only be distinct with 
respect to a few things at once and they are differentiated by the relations or, so 
to speak, by the points of view of the mirrors, which make it that the same 
universe is multiplied in an infinity of ways by as many living mirrors, each 
representing it in its own way”.25  
 
Each perception “can only be distinct with respect to a few things at once”. 
Among the “few things” that each monad perceives relatively more distinctly is 
its own organic body. We’ve already had reason to note how although the soul 
perceives everything in the universe, it does so from the perspectival view 
afforded by its perceptions of its own body. The soul perceives external bodies 
only through their relationship to its own. What Leibniz infers from this is that, 
although it mirrors the whole universe, each soul perceives most distinctly what 
is closest to it, namely, the organic body to which it is attached and within this 
organic body, those parts that are in more immediate contact with the external 
bodies are perceived most distinctly of all. Hence, the nerves are:  
 
“more sensitive parts for us than others, and it is perhaps only through them 
that we apperceive others, which apparently occurs because the movements of 
the nerves or of the liquids belonging to them imitate impressions better and 
confuse them less”.26 
 
Ordinary mirrors too represent their surroundings with different degrees of 
clarity and distinctness. Some have surfaces that are blurred or damaged and can 
represent things only confusedly; others have surfaces that are cleaner and 
brighter and their images are correspondingly sharper and more distinct. 
Equally, just as living monads mirror the universe through the prism of their 
own immediately present and more distinctly perceived bodies, nonliving 
                                                        
25  Leibniz to Remond, July 1714; GP III, 623 / D. Rutherford, 
http://philosophyfaculty.ucsd.edu/faculty/rutherford/Leibniz/translations/RemondVII
1714.pdf 
26 Leibniz to Arnauld, 30 April 1687; A II, 2, 175-176/ LA 113-114. See also, Leibniz to 
Arnauld, 9 October 1687; A II, 2, 241-242.  
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mirrors too represent most distinctly the things in their immediate environs. 
Similarly capable of distinctly representing only “a few things at once”, they 
reflect most distinctly what is closest to them, less distinctly whatever is further 
away in space and in time.27  
 
Although all monads perceive their own bodies more distinctly than they 
perceive the rest of the world, rational monads can also distinctly perceive their 
own perceiving selves. In the following section, we consider how self-reflections 
arise in monad-mirrors and contrast this with the conditions that allow ordinary 
mirrors to contain reflections of themselves.  
 
 
5. Self-reflecting mirrors 
 
At Monadology §30, Leibniz states that it is: 
 
“through the knowledge of necessary truths and through their abstractions that 
we rise to reflective acts, which enable us to think of that which is called ‘I’ and 
enable us to consider that this or that is in us”.28  
 
Being able to think in abstract terms, the self-conscious rational being is able to 
conceive distinctly the ‘I’ (a thing that, a we shall see, by its very nature thinks 
about many things) and to distinguish this perceiving ‘I’ from the things in the 
world at large that it perceives. This means that self-conscious minds or rational 
souls “have incomparably greater perfection than the forms thrust into 
matter”.29 Nevertheless, although the (substantial) forms “thrust into matter” do 
not consciously know themselves as perceivers, it is conceivable that they, albeit 
obscurely, perceive their own perceptions. While in Paris, Leibniz had written a 
short piece known as On Reminiscence and on the Mind’s Self-reflection. The piece 
is an account of Leibniz’s own forays into the spiral of thoughts generated by his 
thinking of his thinking, then thinking of his thinking of his thinking, and so on. 
Being aware of the recursive nature of the procedure and of the temporal 
internal between each reflection upon a past reflection – an awareness of the 
“intervals of these beats” – allows Leibniz to conclude that each:  
 
“reflection of a reflection – in the mind a little before … already existed before, 
and so the perception of a perception to infinity is perpetually in the mind”.30  
 
In On Reminiscence and on the Mind’s Self-reflection, Leibniz is concerned only 
with those reflections of reflections of which he is consciously aware. However, if 
the reflections of reflections are already in the mind, then prior to their being 
consciously perceived, they must be in the mind as obscure rather than distinct 
perceptions of perceptions. Indeed, we may presume that there is an infinity of 
obscurely perceived perceptions of perceptions in the mind. And this in turn 
                                                        
27 Neither the finite monad mirror nor the ordinary physical mirror, we may add, 
reflects its surroundings with absolute clarity and distinctness. 
28 GP VI, 612/ AG 217. Cp. Discourse on Metaphysics §34; A VI, 4B, 1583. 
29 New System; GP IV, 478/ AG 140. 
30 DSR 74-75. 
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opens up the possibility that even though the lowest, most obscurely perceiving 
monads have no distinct awareness of themselves as perceiving beings, 
perceptions of perceptions might nevertheless occur ad infinitum in them too.  
 
Whether perception of their perceptions to infinity occurs in all monads will not 
be further investigated here. It is sufficient for our purposes to note that bare 
monads’ perceptions of their perceptions, if such they have, and minds’ 
reflections of themselves arise entirely from within the monads themselves. 
None has any windows through which anything can enter or depart.31 All of a 
monad’s perceptions, including any self-perceptions, arise, not through the 
action of anything external, but solely through the activity of the monad’s own 
internal force.  
 
As concentrated worlds,32 complete in themselves, living mirrors reflections of 
themselves or their perceptions of their perceptions occur independently of, and 
irrespective of, the existence or non-existence of other living mirrors. Ordinary, 
nonliving mirrors, on the other hand, contain reflections of themselves and 
reflections of their own images only in the presence of other existing mirrors. 
Only when nonliving mirrors are placed directly in front of each other does the 
image of the one reflected in the other find its way back to the first as a reflection 
of the reflected image. Admittedly, when nonliving mirrors reflect each other in 
this way, the reflections in each facing mirror multiply ad infinitum. Like the 
mind’s “perception of a perception to infinity” described by Leibniz in his Paris 
Notes, each mirror’s image of itself is reproduced endlessly over and over again. 
Still, it remains the case that an ordinary lifeless mirror can only ‘see’ itself, as it 
were, by reflecting the image of itself as it appears in the other. Whether mirrors’ 
self-reflections do or do not depend upon the existence of other mirrors would 
therefore appear to mark a fundamental point of difference between living and 
nonliving mirrors: ordinary mirrors’ self-reflections occur only if other mirrors 
exist, but monads’ self-reflections occur regardless of whether any other monad-
mirrors exist.  
 
All metaphors eventually reach a point of collapse and we might consider this to 
be that point. However, although undoubtedly the issues exposes tension in the 
metaphor, I do not believe we have yet reached the metaphor’s final breaking 
point. The metaphor has yet more to reveal, for although it is the true that the 
indivisible unity and independence of the monad means that the actual existence 
of other mirrors is not essential to the monad’s ability to reflect upon itself, the 
monad’s self-reflection, like self-reflection in nonliving mirrors, is dependent 
upon the mirror’s ability to contain in itself images of external things.  
 
We began this section with a quotation from the Monadology in which Leibniz 
describes the mind’s “reflective acts” as acts that “enable us to think of that which 
is called ‘I’ and enable us to consider that this or that is in us” and in which he 
claims that these acts of self-reflection are made possible “through our 
                                                        
31 Monadology §7; GP VI, 607.  
32 Leibniz to De Volder, 20 June 1703; LV 262-263. 
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knowledge of necessary truths and through their abstractions”.33 The omission 
of any reference to the soul’s sensory perceptions of others encourages the view 
that Leibniz regarded sense perceptions of external things as irrelevant to the 
mind’s ability to reflect upon itself. His highlighting of knowledge of necessary 
truths and abstractions gives the impression that he believes that the only things 
that the self-reflecting mind needs to consider as being in it are its abstract and 
necessary innate ideas. This impression is reinforced by some remarks of Leibniz 
in the Preface to the New Essays:  
 
“reflection is nothing but attention to what is within us, and the senses do not 
give us what we carry with us already. In view of this, can it be denied that there 
is a great deal that is innate in our minds, since we are innate to ourselves, so to 
speak, and since we include Being, Unity, Substance, Duration, Change, Action, 
Perception, Pleasure, and hosts of other objects of our intellectual ideas?” 34 
 
However, as Leibniz had already observed in the Discourse on Metaphysics, the 
distinction between ideas that are innate and ideas that are derived from the 
senses, although useful, is not in metaphysical strictness, defensible. 35 
Everything that is ‘in us’ is innate. Technically, the senses do not give us anything 
at all. The point is made even in the opening chapter of the New Essays, where 
Leibniz confesses his belief that “all the thoughts and actions of our soul come 
from its own depths and could not be given to it by the senses”.36 Leibniz 
reiterates the point a few years later in a letter to Coste:  
 
“I have also shown that when we take things in a certain metaphysical sense, we 
are always in a state of perfect spontaneity, and that what we attribute to the 
impressions of external things arises only from confused perceptions in us 
corresponding to them”.37 
 
There are ‘in us’ not only those ideas we call ‘innate’, but also numerous 
confused perceptions and even “at every moment there is an infinity of 
perceptions unaccompanied by awareness or reflection”.38 When, therefore, the 
mind reflects upon itself and considers “this or that” to be in it, should not the 
“this or that” include at least the mind’s sensory perceptions as well as its more 
abstract thoughts? After all, “this nature that pertains to the soul is 
representative of the universe in a very exact manner (though more or less 
distinctly)”.39 When self-consciously reflecting upon its own representative 
nature as a mirror of a universe populated by an infinity of other mirrors, should 
not the mind take into account not only its general abstract idea of itself as a 
perceiving substance, but also its particular perceptions of these other mirrors, 
as seen from its own unique perspective?  
                                                        
33 Monadology §30; GP VI, 612/ AG 217. 
34 A VI, 6, 51/ RB 51. See also, Discourse on Metaphysics §27; A VI, 4B, 1571-1572 and 
Letter to Queen Sophie Charlotte of Prussia, On What is Independent of Sense and Matter; 
GP VI, 501-502.  
35 Discourse on Metaphysics §27; A VI, 4B, 1571-1572. 
36 A VI, 6, 74/ RB 74. 
37 Leibniz to Coste, 19 December 1707; GP III, 403/ AG 195.  
38 New Essays Preface; A VI, 6, 53/RB 53. 
39 New System; GP IV, 485/ AG 144. 
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If so, the self-reflections of rational living mirrors are not so far removed from 
the self-reflections ordinary nonliving mirrors as first it seemed. The nonliving 
mirror can only contain images of itself by reflecting the image of itself that is 
contained in another. Effectively, it needs to have an image of the other mirror if 
it is to reflect itself. Of course, the windowless living mirror self-reflects by 
turning inwards to perceive its own substantial self and its perceptions, but its 
own nature dictates that within itself are contained perceptions or images of 
mirrors outside of itself. Effectively, it too needs to have images of other mirrors 
if it is to self-consciously reflect on its reflections. It would appear, then, that for 
both the living and the nonliving mirror, self-reflection involves the having of 
images of mirrors other than itself. 
 
In the next and final section, our discussion turns to morals. Throughout history, 
ordinary mirrors have been regarded as having instrumental value and 
significance for the moral improvement of human beings.40 However, they are 
obviously not themselves moral agents. I will therefore put aside discussion of 
the ordinary mirror in order to explore, albeit with a broad brush, the moral 
nature of rational self-reflecting minds and why it is important ethically that the 
mind’s images of other mirrors are as distinct or perfect as it is possible for them 
to be. 
 
 
6. Moral mirrors 
  
On account of their rationality and knowledge of the eternal truths – the 
facilitating grounds of their self-reflective acts – minds are able not only to 
consciously appreciate the perfection of God’s works, but also to self-consciously 
imitate God’s works in their own productions and activities, basing their choices 
and deliberations on considerations of what is good and what is for the best for 
themselves and for others. For these reasons, each mind is said to be “an image 
of the divinity”41 and is a member of the moral City of God where God, ruling as 
both monarch42 and legislator,43 ensures that “there will be no good action that is 
unrewarded, no bad action that goes unpunished”.44  
 
As rational images of the divine, it is incumbent upon us to perfect our own 
natures so that we may reflect the glory of God to the very best of our abilities. 
The perfecting of our own natures consists in making our perceptions as distinct 
as we can: “the soul itself knows the things it perceives only so far as it has 
distinct and heightened [revelées] perceptions; and it has perfection to the extent 
that it has distinct perceptions”.45 To perfect our souls is to polish our mirror, so 
that it reflects the universe without blemish or contortion. Mirroring the best 
                                                        
40 See, for instance, Melchior Bonnet: The Mirror, pp. 105-115. 
41 Principles of Nature and Grace §14; GP VI, 604/ AG 211. See also Monadology §83; GP 
VI, 621.  
42 Monadology §87; GP VI, 622. 
43 Monadology §89; GP VI, 622. 
44 Monadology §90; GP VI, 622/ AG 224. 
45 Principles of Nature and Grace, §13; GP VI, 604/ AG 211. 
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possible world distinctly exposes its perfection: its harmony, beauty, and 
goodness. Leibniz defines beauty in terms of the pleasurable feelings we derive 
from contemplating beautiful things46 and he conceives benevolent love in terms 
of the disposition to derive pleasure from “the perfection, well-being or 
happiness” of those beings who are themselves capable of pleasure or 
happiness.47 We wish well those whom we love, assist them in their endeavours, 
and, when they flourish, we are pleased for their sakes, not for our own.  
 
Mirrors, as we found earlier, reflect the past, present and future of the universe. 
This prompts the question whether the love we feel towards beings capable of 
happiness is possible only in relation to those who are present to us today or can 
(and perhaps should) it be extended to those in the past and in the future? How 
could this be so, one might ask? Surely those who existed in the past cannot be 
objects of love for they no longer exist and are no longer capable of happiness. 
Equally, those who might exist in the future cannot be the objects of our love for 
they do not yet exist and indeed they might never come into existence. Currently, 
they are only vague possibilities and possibilities are not capable of pleasure and 
happiness. But no such response is available to Leibniz. The indestructibility of 
the monads entails that everything created in the first moment of time still exists 
in some form now and will continue to exist in some form in the future, while 
pre-established harmony ensures that the futures of all living things are not 
mere possibilities, but are already mapped out with certainty.  
 
“[D]eath”, considers Leibniz, “is nothing but the contraction of an animal, just as 
generation is nothing but its unfolding”.48 Death is neither the end of existence 
nor the end of perception, but merely the falling into unconsciousness, as if into a 
deep sleep, where all perceptions are insensible and indistinct.49 For nonhuman 
animals, Leibniz theorizes, death consists in a diminution of their being that 
causes them to “reenter the recesses of a world of minute creatures”, from which 
they may at some point in the future emerge.50 Rational minds, however, enjoy a 
different fate. They do not find themselves exiled to the depths of the material 
world.51 Nor is their citizenship of the City of God revoked: the “republic can 
never lose any of its members”52 and it is because of this, that minds “must 
always keep their moral qualities and their memory”.53  Whether Leibniz 
considered minds might self-consciously retain their memories in death is not 
clear. When, for instance, in the preface to the New Essays, he writes that “death 
can only be a sleep, and not a lasting one at that”, he confines his remark to the 
                                                        
46 Elements of Natural Law; A VI, 1, 464/ L 137: “We seek beautiful things because they 
are pleasant, for I define beauty as that, the contemplation of which is pleasant”. 
47 New Essays; A VI, 6, 163/ RB 163.  
48 To Johann Bernoulli, 18 November 1698; GM III, 553/ AG 169. See also Principles of 
Nature and Grace §6; GP VI, 601-602. 
49 New Essays Preface; A VI, 6, 55/ RB 55. 
50 Leibniz to Arnauld, 30 April 1687; A II, 2, 189/ AG 88. 
51 Ibid.  
52 Ibid.; A II, 2, 189-190. 
53 Ibid.; A II 2 189. 
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animals, declining to “discuss the case of man, who must in this regard have 
special prerogatives for safeguarding his personhood”.54  
 
Whatever the precise nature of their post-death states, it is clearly Leibniz’s view 
that rational souls – and indeed all souls – continue to exist as substances after 
death and that each continues to mirror, however obscurely, the universe from 
its own point of view. If rational beings retain their personalities and their 
memories even after death, then either they remain self-conscious in their death 
states or they will one day awaken from their deep slumbers. In either case, 
might we not assume that they are still capable of happiness and perfection, and 
therefore still possible objects of love – love, as we recall, being the disposition to 
be pleased by the other’s “perfection, well-being or happiness”?55  
 
Our own perfectibility, as was have seen, lies in the making more distinct our 
perceptions of the world, so that we may more distinctly perceive the perfection, 
beauty and goodness of the world and each of its constituents, and through this 
come to love not only God, the most perfect being, but also all rational beings 
capable of happiness that God has created. And insofar as we are rational living 
mirrors of the universe whose perceptions extend backwards into the past and 
forwards into the future, do we not have a moral responsibility to seek the good 
throughout the whole, not just in that little part of the mirror that represents the 
present (or more precisely the near past), and to love to the best of our abilities 
all the rational beings we find there?  
 
Leibniz is one such rational being. In this tercentenary year of his death, we 
commemorate his mirrored perspective on the world. And when we reflect on 
the perceptions that are in each of us, let us find among them reflections of 
Leibniz that distinctly highlight the beauty and perfection of his mirror of the 
best possible world, reflections that dispose us to love Leibniz and to derive 
pleasure from the thought of his present or future happiness and well-being.  
 
                                                        
54 A VI, 6, 55/ RB 55. 
55 New Essays; A VI,6, 163/ RB 163. 
